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of stock returns. Our results suggest that political news associated with a possible 
separation of Quebec from Canada plays an important role in the volatility of stock 
returns. We also show that the volatility of stock returns varies with the degree of a 
firm’s exposure to political risk, namely, the structure of assets and the extent of 
foreign involvement.   2 
THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL RISK ON THE VOLATILITY OF STOCK  
RETURNS: THE CASE OF CANADA 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several studies suggest that political risk should be taken into account when analyzing the 
volatility of stock market returns. For example, Schwert (1989) notes that the volatility of stock 
market returns in the United States during the Great Depression (1929-1939) could be attributed 
to political uncertainty regarding the survival of the capitalist system in the United States. Chan 
and Wei (1996) measure political risk based on political news and note a significant relationship 
between this news and the volatility of stock returns in Hong Kong. Along the same lines, 
Bittlingmayer (1998) contends that political risk was an important source of the variation in the 
volatility of stock market returns in Germany from 1880 to 1940. Finally, according to 
Aggarwal, Inclan and Leal (1999), variations in emerging stock market returns are, for the most 
part, country specific and associated with political events. 
The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the political risk associated with a 
possible Quebec independence on the volatility of stock returns. Several facts argue in favor of 
such a study. First, the presence of political risk is a worldwide phenomenon that affected most 
national stock markets in the twentieth century. Jorion and Goetzmann (1999) report that events 
of a political nature have led to market transaction interruptions in twenty-five countries, 
including Chile, France, Germany, Japan and Portugal.   Second, our study involves a developed 
financial market in which financial information is easily available for most enterprises. 
Furthermore, variations in Canadian political risk are "pure" events that are unrelated, for   3 
example, to episodes of market liberalization, as is often the case in emerging markets. Thus, our 
study makes it possible to more accurately assess how variations in political risk affect the 
volatility of stock returns. Third, the focus of this study, Canada, is well suited for an 
examination of the impact of political risk on the volatility of stock returns.  As discussed below, 
Canadian political risk is of the most common type faced by firms since the beginnings of the 
1980s, that is a risk that affects the operations of firms rather than the ownership of assets 
(Minor, 1994; Wells, 1998).  Fourth, very few studies (Phillips-Patrick, 1989; Bailey and Chung, 
1995, Chan and Wei, 1996) have examined the impact of political risk on the stock market at the 
microeconomic level. The existing empirical literature has generally focused on the country as a 
whole and has implicitly assumed that political risk affects all firms identically. Finally, 
forecasting financial market volatility is important for portfolio selection and asset management 
as well as for pricing primary and derivative securities.  
For the purpose of this study, we consider that Quebec firms are not equally exposed to 
political risk.  In doing so, we follow the political risk literature which argues that the 
vulnerability to political risk is firm-specific (see, for example, Kobrin (1982)).  We construct 
different firm portfolios on the basis of two components of firms’ exposure to political risk : the 
structure of assets (assets in place versus growth options) and the degree of foreign involvement. 
Furthermore, in addition to an analysis of its impact on the volatility of stock returns, we shall 
investigate whether political risk has a bearing on investors’ required returns.  Providing 
evidence that investors require (do not require) a political risk premium would mean that 
political risk is nondiversifiable (diversifiable) (Butler and Joaquim, 1998).   
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways. First, we consider an 
operational measure of firms’ exposure to political risk and we examine the importance of   4 
political news on different portfolios that account for different levels of exposure to political 
risk. Second, we compare our results from a matched sample of Canadian (apart from Quebec) 
and American firms to assess the specificity of our results to the Quebec or Canadian market. 
Third, we propose the use of a statistical model that allows us to look for the impact of political 
risk at three different levels, namely, the mean of our portfolio returns, its time-varying risk 
premium and the conditional variance of our portfolios. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the theoretical 
framework, discussing the relationship between political risk and stock return volatility. Section 
III presents the hypotheses and the methodology for testing the relationship between Quebec 
political risk and stock market volatility. In section IV, we describe our sample. In section V, we 
present results while Section VI concludes. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. The political context 
Following Wells (1998, p. 15) and Henisz (2002, p. 5), political risks can be defined as 
“risks [to a firm’s profitability] that are principally the results of forces external to the industry 
and which involve some sort of government action or, occasionally, inaction”.  These 
government actions which could change the business environment of firms are expropriation, 
policy shifts in taxation or regulation, imposition of capital and foreign exchange controls. In 
Canada, political risk is associated with the possible separation of the Province of Quebec from 
the Canadian federation and is traced to the creation of the Parti Quebecois in 1968, a political 
party dedicated to Quebec sovereignty. Following defeats in the provincial elections of 1970 and 
1973, the Parti Quebecois won the 1976 elections and formed Quebec’s government. This led to   5 
the first episode of political uncertainty, which ended in 1980 with a defeat in a referendum on 
sovereignty. The second episode of political uncertainty began in the 1990s with the failed 
efforts of the Canadian and provincial governments to solve the “Quebec problem”.  A new 
referendum on sovereignty held in 1995 was defeated by 50.6 % of voters. This very small 
margin has led the Parti Quebecois, reelected in 1998, to contemplate the possibility of an other 
referendum on Quebec’s political future. Thus the political uncertainty in Canada has not yet 
been put to rest.  
B. Political risk and stock returns 
The impact of political risk on the volatility of stock returns is based on the premise that 
the value of a firm is equal to the present value of its expected cash flows, whereas the discount 
rate represents investors’ required rate of return. If there is uncertainty regarding the possible 
separation of Quebec, the range of realizations for expected cash flows and discount rates for 
individual Quebec firms should be wider and the variance of firms’ returns should grow 
accordingly. We now discuss the impact of a possible separation of Quebec on the two 
components of the value of a firm. 
A Quebec separation could lead to changes in the cash flows of Quebec-based firms 
through the uncertainty associated with the fiscal, trade and investment policies. On the fiscal 
front, Quebec’s independence could lead to a tax increase to finance transition costs. On the 
international front, the renegotiation of several international treaties, such as NAFTA, are likely 
to create a climate of uncertainty. The waiting period related to this renegotiation of NAFTA 
could cause a loss of revenues for local firms exporting to the United States and Mexico, 
affecting the future cash flows of these firms. Finally, the political uncertainty associated with a   6 
possible independence of Quebec could lead to a reduction in investments in Quebec and a 
decrease in the cash flows of Quebec-based firms (Altug, Demers and Demers, 2000).  
Quebec separation could also lead to changes in discount rates through the uncertainty 
associated with monetary policy. Separation from the Canadian federation would be costly for 
Quebec, which could well face a financial crisis (Altug, Demers and Demers, 2000). First, 
Quebec would suffer from a large current account deficit. Second, it would have a large debt 
problem amounting to over 120% of its GDP.  Third, a possible capital flight could lead to a fall 
in the value of the Canadian dollar
  and a rise in interest rates.
 This would mean an increase of 
the cost of capital of Quebec-based firms. 
 
III. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
A. Measures of Political Risk 
We propose to study the relationship between political risk and stock return volatility. To 
do so, we assess the response of Quebec-based firms’ stock returns to political news associated 
with Quebec independence and released in the press. We distinguish the impact of favorable and 
unfavorable political news on the volatility of stock returns of Quebec-based firms. Favorable 
(unfavorable) news will decrease (increase) the uncertainty about future cash flows and stock 
prices.  Thus, we expect favorable political news to decrease stock return volatility while 
unfavorable political news should increase stock return volatility. In our empirical analysis, we 
also include two matched samples to the Quebec firm portfolios. The first one contains Canadian 
firms (excluding Quebec firms) in order to assess whether political risk is relevant for the rest of 
the Canadian market. Finally, we use a matched sample of American firms. This also allows us 
to determine whether our choice of political risk proxy is fortuitous.    7 
B. Measures of Exposure to Political Risk and Hypotheses 
We use two measures to assess the degree of exposure to political risk for Quebec firms. 
The first measure evaluates the firm's degree of mobility based on growth options. Myers (1977) 
breaks the value of a firm down to two components: the assets in place (the value of which does 
not depend on the firm's future investments) and growth options. Growth options play an 
important role in decreasing the exposure of a firm to political risk (Phillips-Patrick, 1989). 
Firms whose value is mainly determined by opportunities for growth are less affected by 
political risk since they can easily move their operations to another region without incurring 
excessive costs.  Conversely, firms whose value is mainly determined by assets in place should 
be more affected by political risk, given the high cost of moving these assets. This leads us to 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
H1: A Quebec firm whose value is mainly determined by growth options will be less affected by 
Quebec political risk than would a Quebec firm whose value is mainly determined by assets in 
place. 
The second measure of exposure to political risk uses the firm's degree of 
internationalization based on the number of countries in which it owns subsidiaries.   
International foreign investment could create new risk factors such as political risk and foreign 
exchange risk. However, several studies maintain that these new risks are diversifiable (e.g., 
Goldberg and Heflin, 1995). In fact, multinational companies are present in a number of 
domestic markets from which they can minimize the impact of fluctuations in interest rates, cost 
of input and salaries by transferring their operations from one market to another. For instance, a 
multinational firm which is headquartered in Quebec but has operations in other countries can   8 
diversify political risk away and will be less affected by a possible Quebec independence than a 
company conducting business solely at the local level.
1 This hypothesis can be formulated as 
follows: 
H2: A multinational Quebec firm will be less sensitive to Quebec political risk than would be a 
purely domestic Quebec firm. 
C. Presentation of the Empirical Model 
To assess the response of Quebec-based firms’ stock returns to political news associated 
with Quebec independence, we use a bivariate modified GARCH (Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity) model (Engle, 1982; Bollerslev, 1986), proposed by Glosten, 
Jagannathan and Runkle (1993), using Engle and Kroner (1995) parameterization (hereafter 
BEKK).   Interestingly, this model accounts for overtime changes in the volatility of stock 
returns.    
Let us define 
mt R  : the rate of return on the benchmark portfolio from time t-1 to t, 
ft r  : the riskless rate of return from time t-1 to t, 
t l  : an indicator variable that takes the value of one when t is the first trading day of the week and zero 
otherwise, 
t H  : the conditional variance-covariance matrix of the system of mean equations with asymmetric 
components, 
mt h  : the conditional variance of the benchmark return on the  t H  matrix, 
imt h  : the conditional covariance of the benchmark return and portfolio i, 
t u  : a vector with components () ′
it mt ε ε ,,  
t η  : a vector with components  ) , ( ′ it mt η η , with mt η = max[] mt , 0 ε −  and  it η = max[] it , 0 ε − , 
FN : a vector with components () ′
i fn , 0,   
UN  : a vector with components () ′
i un , 0 ,    9 
i fn  : a parameter which assesses the impact of favorable news on the volatility of stock returns 
of portfolio i, 
i un  : a parameter which assesses the impact of unfavorable news on the volatility of stock 
returns of portfolio i, 
t 1 D  : a vector with components () t 1 d , 0,  
t 2 D  : a vector with components () t 2 d , 0,  
t d1  : a dummy variable taking the value of one for favorable news and zero otherwise, 
t d2  : a dummy variable taking the value of one for unfavorable news and zero otherwise. 
The bivariate model we estimate is: 
mt 1 ft 1 mt m 2 t m 1 m 0 ft mt ) r R ( l r R ε + − γ + γ + γ = − − −  (1) 
() ( ) it 1 ft 1 it i 2 t i 1 1 ft 1 mt m 2 t m 1 m 0
mt
imt
i 0 ft it r R l ) r R ( l
h
h
r R ε + − γ + γ + − γ + γ + γ + γ = − − − − −  (2) 
A u Au B BH H t t t t ′ ′ + ′ + Γ = − − − 1 1 1 + G G t t ′ ′ − − 1 1η η + t 1 D FN + t 2 D UN . (3)   
 
The conditional bivariate model (equations (1), (2), and (3)) allows us to examine the 
response of the volatility of Quebec firm portfolios based upon the level of exposure to Canadian 
political risk. Equation (1) is the market excess return equation. Equation (2) is the excess return 
equation on one of four portfolios. Equation (3) is a GARCH representation of the variance-
covariance matrix resulting from equations (1) and (2).  Estimated jointly, equations (1), (2) and 
(3) represent a conditional CAPM version of the return of one of our four portfolios for which 
the risk premium in (2) is time-varying. The interest of this modeling is that it allows for the 
presence of political risk through a political news dummy.       
 
We use two variables to predict the excess return of these portfolios and the market 
portfolio.  First, we use a dummy variable for the first trading day of the week for the weekend 
effect (French, 1980). Second, we assume that the excess return follows an autoregressive 
process of order one. This last variable allows for consideration of the autocorrelation problems   10 
related to the non-synchronous trading of returns (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990) or bid-ask spreads 
for portfolios consisting of few traded assets (Stoll and Whaley, 1990). 
In order to assess the impact of political news on the volatility of stock returns, we use a 
two-step approach. First, we identify and classify the political news regarding the separation of 
Quebec from the Canadian federation. Then, we assess the impact of the news on the volatility of 
stock returns for portfolios based upon both measures of exposure to political risk. A description 
of the sample of political news and portfolios follows.  
IV. DATA 
A.  The Sample of News 
Our study covers the period from January 1990 to December 1996. We choose this period 
of analysis for two reasons. First, it includes the four following major events of the second 
episode of political uncertainty in Quebec: the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord in 1990, the 
referendum on the Charlottetown Accord in 1992, the re-election of the Parti Quebecois in 1994 
and the second referendum on Quebec independence in 1995. Second, relevant political news 
following the October 1995 referendum is rare. For example, in 1997, we identify only one item 
of political news associated with the possible independence of Quebec. 
To test our hypotheses we begin by identifying the days on which political news items 
regarding the possible independence of Quebec are released. We examine the Wall Street 
Journal (WSJ) Index and the cited articles appearing in the WSJ to determine the public 
announcement date of all events regarding Quebec’s political future. We classify each event as 
being unfavorable or favorable. An unfavorable event describes a situation with high political 
risk: for example, the Quebec government’s announcement that a referendum on sovereignty   11 
would take place on October 30
th, 1995. On the contrary, a favorable event describes a situation 
with low political risk such as the news that there are signs of a lull in the confrontation between 
the Canadian and Quebec governments. Since the interpretation of a political risk event, as 
provided in the WSJ, is usually inseparable from the stock price movement, we separate 
classification and choice of news and proceed as follows. Two observers (graduate students) are 
asked to place each event into one of three categories: favorable, ambiguous or unfavorable. In 
case of disagreement, a third observer breaks the tie. If the third observer cannot place it in one 
of the two categories already chosen, the event is considered unclassified. In addition to the list 
of news, the observers are provided with a written note describing the goals of the research and 
defining political risk. Using these selection criteria, we obtain a sample of sixty-seven political 
news items likely to affect the perception of political risk associated with Quebec’s 
independence over the period from 1990 to 1996. Out of sixty-seven political news items, thirty-
eight are deemed unfavorable (bad), twenty-four favorable (good) and five ambiguous. Thus our 
empirical investigation involves sixty-two political news items since we disregard the five items 
deemed ambiguous.  An appendix gives the list of news dates, headlines and the classification of 
political news. 
B.  The Sample of Quebec Firms 
Our initial sample consists of 102 firms, headquartered in the Province of Quebec and 
listed on the Montreal Stock Exchange and/or on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The data source 
for stock returns is Datastream.  The accounting data used to measure growth options are taken 
from Stock Guide, a publication that provides financial information on Canadian firms. The final 
sample for which we have both common stock prices and accounting data consists of seventy-
one Quebec firms.  The sampled firms are then subdivided into two sets of portfolios according   12 
to our measures of political risk exposure: (1) growth options versus assets in place; (2) domestic 
versus multinational operations. The first subdivision creates two portfolios of Quebec firms: (1) 
firms with high growth options and (2) firms with low growth options. 
 To classify a Quebec 
firm as having high growth options, the market value to book value ratio must be greater than the 
median of the sample. This ratio measures the growth opportunities of a firm because its market 
value is the value of both assets in place and growth options while its book value reflects only 
the assets in place.  The second subdivision creates two portfolios of Quebec firms according to 
the level of foreign activities: the first consists of forty-five purely domestic companies and the 
second of twenty-six multinational companies that operate in at least one foreign country.
2 We 
draw information regarding the number of foreign subsidiaries from Who Owns Whom 1989, a 
Dun and Bradstreet publication. The year 1989 (the year preceding the period of analysis) is used 
to measure the two criteria for political risk exposure. The portfolios are then kept fixed over the 
time period covered by our study.  The weights are chosen according to the market value of each 
firm in the overall value of the portfolio in 1989.  Rebalancing only occurs if firms drop out 
during our sampling period.
3 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the size distribution of Quebec firm portfolios, with size 
measured as the book value of total assets. As expected, Quebec multinational firms are large 
whereas purely domestic Quebec-based firms are either small or medium-sized. As for the two 
portfolios of Quebec firms exhibiting different levels of growth options, we find that the 
percentage of small firms with low growth options is slightly larger than the percentage of firms 
with high growth options. Stock return volatility could vary with the industry (Campbell and 
Lettau, 1999). Our Quebec firm portfolios are spread over a wide range of industries, as shown 
in Panel B of Table 1. Most industries are represented in the four portfolios of Quebec firms.   13 
Table 2 shows the distribution of our samples according to the levels of growth options and 
foreign operations. Most Quebec multinational firms are characterized by a high level of growth 
options while most domestic firms operating in Quebec are characterized by a low level of 
growth options. Finally, 96% of Quebec multinational firms operate in at least two foreign 
countries and 50% of the multinational firms in our sample operate in at least seven foreign 
countries. 
C.  The Matching Sample of Canadian and American Firms 
We create a control sample of Canadian (apart from Quebec) and American firms as 
follows. First, to control for the industry in which the Quebec firms belong, we match each 
Quebec firm to all Canadian (U.S.) firms in the same four-digit SIC code. Second, among these, 
we select the firm whose total assets, value of growth options (measured by the ratio of market to 
book value of assets) and degree of internationalization (measured by the number of foreign 
countries in which the firm owns subsidiaries) are between 70 and 130 per cent of the size, the 
value of growth options and the degree of internationalization of the Quebec-based firm at the 
end of 1989. If several Canadian (U.S.) firms meet this criterion, we choose the firm for which 
the value of growth options and the degree of internationalization are closest to those of the 
Quebec firm. In the absence of Canadian (U.S.) firms which have both the same four-digit SIC 
code and meet the matching criteria (the value of growth options and the degree of 
internationalization), we consider Canadian (U.S.) firms with the same three-digit or two-digit 
SIC codes. Information on the matching sample of Canadian (U.S.) firms is taken from 
Compustat and Who Owns Whom. The data sources for stock returns of Canadian and American 
firm, are TSE-Western and Datastream, respectively.   14 
V. RESULTS 
A.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the distribution of stock returns for the market 
portfolio and the Quebec firm portfolios. Q(12) (Q
2(12)) is the Ljung-Box (1978) test statistic for 
the first 12 lags of the autocorrelation function for the (squared) standardized residuals of the 
pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation of the different portfolios with constant variance. The 
results suggest that for both the reference market portfolio and the four Quebec firm portfolios 
the null hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in the residuals is 
rejected.  This justifies the use of  GARCH models to describe the behavior of the stock returns 
of Quebec firm portfolios.  
B. Political News and Stock Return Volatility 
Table 4 reports the results of the estimation of the model we used to test the relationship 
between political news and the stock return volatility of Quebec-based firms. For the sake of 
conciseness, we present results for the most relevant parameters for our analysis but full results 
are available from the authors upon request.  First, we find that the coefficient associated with 
the autoregressive term of order one is significantly different from zero for the market portfolio 
( m 2 γ ) and the Quebec firm portfolios ( i 2 γ ). This result is consistent with non-synchronous 
trading (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). In the case of the portfolio of purely domestic Quebec firms, 
the coefficient associated with the autoregressive term of order one is negative.  This result is 
consistent with large bid-ask spreads of the component stocks of a portfolio consisting of few 
stocks (Stoll and Whaley, 1990).  Second, the results of the model suggest that ARCH and 
GARCH effects (coefficients α  and β ) are statistically significant for the market portfolio and the   15 
Quebec firm portfolios. We also find that the coefficient for  asymmetric volatility for the market 
index (gm) is positive and statistically significant.  
The results, shown in Table 4, suggest that political news affects mainly Quebec-based 
firms that we hypothesized would be more exposed to political risk, that is, purely domestic 
firms or low growth option firms. The coefficients associated with favorable (fni) and 
unfavorable (uni) political news are not statistically significant for the portfolios of multinational 
and high growth option firms. Furthermore, favorable and unfavorable political news does not 
seem to affect the volatility of stock returns identically. Generally speaking, unfavorable 
(favorable) political news increases (decreases) the total conditional variance of portfolios of 
firms more exposed to political risk.  
We find an asymmetric response to positive (favorable) versus negative (unfavorable) 
political news, with unfavorable news resulting in a larger volatility response than favorable 
news.  Two explanations could be provided for this result. Firstly, we have shown that purely 
domestic firms and low-growth-option firms are small-sized firms. According to McQueen, 
Pinegar and Thorley (1996), the asymmetrical response of the stock market could be traced to a 
size effect. These authors argue that the stock market reacts quickly to the announcement of 
unfavorable news while it reacts slowly to the announcement of favorable news. This difference 
prevails in particular for small firms. This delay in reaction time could reduce and dilute the 
impact of  favorable political news on the volatility of stock returns. Secondly, it can be argued 
that unfavorable news has more information content (Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 1995) and 
there is more media coverage (Dielman and Oppenheimer, 1984) than for favorable news.  This 
could amplify the impact of such news on the volatility of stock returns.     16 
Table 5 gives the diagnostic checks for the model of different portfolios. Report results of 
diagnostic checks for the valuation model of stock returns. We consider conditional moment 
(CM) tests (Newey, 1985). The results of our tests suggest that CM tests for the presence of 
political news in the conditional mean of our portfolios as well as in the conditional covariance 
of each of these portfolios with the market return are rejected. Our results show that there may be 
no role in the mean or in the covariance of portfolio returns for a given exogenous variable while 
this variable appears important in the variance of the portfolios. In our case, the fact that 
portfolios contain a small number of firms and that firms are chosen according to shared 
characteristics, it is possible that the variance of our portfolios contains some non systematic 
risk.  
Other specification tests developed by Kroner and Ng (1998) are not presented here but 
they show that our model is reasonably well specified. The fact that we find no role for political 
news in the conditional mean or covariance of the different portfolios formed in this study 
suggests (whether we include news in the variance or not) that political risk is diversified away. 
Such a result corroborates Butler and Joaquim’s (1995) argument that for global investors local 
political risk is diversifiable and does not affect investors’ required returns.  However, the 
overall conditional variance of the portfolios of both domestic firms and firms with low growth 
options is increased. We also calculated the unconditional variance of our model and show that is 
larger (smaller) in presence of unfavorable (favorable) news.  Given that our measure of 
unconditional variance is very close to that of a bivariate model without a risk premium, we infer 
that the total variance of the firm is increased (decreased) in presence of unfavorable (favorable) 
news.  This implies that political risk affects the total risk born by firms exposed to it.
4  
   17 
C. Political News and the Stock Return Volatility of Matching Samples of Canadian and 
American Firms 
The objective of these additional tests is to show that the results shown in the preceding 
section are specific to Quebec-based firms. We do not expect Canadian political risk to be 
important for American firms and therefore to influence the behavior of the stock return 
volatility of these firms for at least two reasons.  First, in the 1990s and particularly during the 
1995 referendum campaign, Canadian political risk was not covered by the United States media.  
This could reflect the fact that the activities and therefore the stakes of American firms in 
Quebec are limited. Second, there is not a significant transmission of stock market return 
volatility from Canada to the United States (Karolyi, 1995).  In contrast, uncertainty about the 
independence of Quebec could affect stock return of Canadian firms, headquartered outside 
Quebec, via the different channels discussed in Section II.B, such as changes in the Canadian 
interest rates and tax rates.     
Table 6 reports the results of our estimation for the four matched portfolios of Canadian 
firms. As in our Quebec sample, political news associated with Quebec independence affects the 
volatility of the Canadian firm portfolios.  The coefficients for the favorable and unfavorable 
news are significant for the same two portfolios of Canadian firms.  These results indicate that 
political news associated with a possible Quebec independence is an important factor in 
explaining the stock return volatility of Canadian firms with purely domestic operations or with 
low growth options. Contrary to our domestic firm portfolios in our Quebec sample which 
exhibits a negative AR(1), the coefficient associated with the autoregressive term of order one 
for the four portfolios in the matched sample of Canadian firms is always positive.  This suggests   18 
that our Quebec result cannot be attributed to larger bid-ask spreads for the component firms of 
the portfolios more exposed to political risk.   
The results for the sample of American firms are not presented here but are available from 
the authors upon request. They suggest that political news plays no role in explaining the stock 
return volatility of the matched American portfolios. This implies that the choice of political 
news is not fortuitous.
 5 
D.  Robustness Tests 
This section briefly discusses the results of two robustness tests that we performed. First, 
we consider another proxy for growth options, namely Tobin’s Q. This measure is equal to the 
ratio of the firm’s market value to the replacement value of its assets. Tobin’s Q differs from the 
ratio of the market value to the firm’s accounting value in two ways: (1) the addition of the debt 
value to the common stock value and (2) the use of the replacement value for all the elements of 
the asset instead of the historical value of the asset. The results on the impact of political news 
on the stock return volatility do not change with this alternative measure of growth options.
 
Second, we use the TSE 300 index as a proxy for the market index. The substitution of this index 
for the MSCI does not change our results markedly. In particular, we find that political news 
affects only the stock return volatility of portfolios made up of Quebec firms with low growth 
options or with purely domestic activities. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper studies the impact of political risk on the stock return volatility of Quebec-
based firms. To do so, we assess the volatility response of Quebec-based firms’ stock returns to 
political news associated with Quebec’s separation from the Canadian federation. The results of   19 
our study suggest that the political risk associated with a possible independence of Quebec plays 
an important role in the conditional volatility of stock returns but none in the returns or risk 
premiums of our portfolios. We also show that the stock return volatility varies with the degree 
of a firm’s exposure to political risk. Specifically, we find that political news affects the stock 
return volatility of firms that are either mainly characterized by assets in place or purely 
domestic while they do not affect the stock return volatility of firms that have a large degree of 
either growth options or international operations. Finally, the results of our study suggest that 
unfavorable political risk news has a more significant impact on the volatility of stock returns 
than favorable political risk news. Our results are complemented with two matched samples of 
Canadian (excluding Quebec firms) and American portfolios. The Canadian sample indicates 
that political risk is important in the conditional variance of the same portfolios as the Quebec 
sample while the American sample shows no effect. This implies that the Canadian market 
outside of Quebec is also affected by political risk but that the American firms are not. 
Our paper complements the evidence documented in Aggarwal, Inclan and Leal (1999) on 
the impact of political events on the stock return volatility of emerging markets. We bring to 
light the importance of political events in determining stock return volatility in a major 
developed market that offers long and reliable time series, the Canadian stock market.  We 
contribute to the political risk literature by showing that the exposure to political risk varies with 
two characteristics of firms, that is, the nature of their assets and the level of their international 
activities.  These results are in agreement with the international business literature which argues 
(e.g., Kobrin, 1982) that the vulnerability to political risk is firm-specific.  Our evidence also 
suggests that unfavorable political news has a greater impact on stock return volatility than 
favorable political news.  Finally, we find no role for political news in the conditional mean or   20 
covariance of the different portfolios formed in this study. This suggests that political risk can be 
diversified away and does not affect investors’ required returns. We also find an increase in total 
variance. However, there is only a compensation for systematic risk. Investors who naturally 
hold large amounts of this risk incur accrued costs by diversifying or holding it.
 
 The results of this paper have two important implications.  First, the evidence that political 
risk news contributes to stock market volatility suggests that political risk news should be 
considered when modeling stock market volatility. This is all the more important since events of 
a political nature are a worldwide phenomenon that affects most national stock markets (Jorion 
and Goetzmann, 1999). Second, the exposure to political risk varies with two characteristics of 
firms, that is, the nature of their assets and the level of their international activities. We believe 
that some possible extensions of this work deserve to be considered. First, using the approach 
developed here, we  could examine the impact of political risk on the volatility of other stock 
markets, for example, emerging markets that are often viewed as the stock markets of politically 
risky countries.  Second, further research could investigate the impact of Canadian political risk 
on the stock market volatility of foreign firms operating in Canada. From an international 
business perspective, it would be interesting to assess whether the exposure of foreign firms to 
political risk varies with the structure of assets (assets in place versus growth options) and to 
contrast the volatility of stock returns of domestic and foreign firms operating in Canada.   
Finally, we could  investigate the stock market reaction to Canadian political risk news items 
using an event study methodology that allows for overtime changes in stock return volatility.  
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NOTES 
 
1. An alternative measure of internationalization would be the percentage of foreign sales in 
relation to total sales. We did not consider this measure for two reasons. First, the effect of a 
possible Quebec independence on Quebec exporting firms is ambiguous. On one hand, Quebec 
exporting firms could benefit from the fall in the value of the Canadian dollar associated with the 
political uncertainty in Canada.  On the other hand, Quebec export firms will be faced with the 
business uncertainty related to the renegotiation of international treaties with the rest of Canada 
and the United States.  Second, data on export sales are not available for most Quebec firms. 
2. Note that we do not count Canadian (out of Quebec) subsidiaries as foreign.  Further evidence, 
presented below, suggests that the volatility of stock returns of Canadian domestic firms reflects 
the political news associated with a possible independence of Quebec. 
3. Note that the results are qualitatively similar with equally weighted portfolios.   
4. We can draw a parallel between our results and those provided in Burnie (1994).  Burnie 
shows that the incidence of separation news around the sale of Quebec debt issues is associated 
with a specific increase to issuers’ costs.  These costs are additional fees that are paid to the 
investment banking syndicate but not an increase in the market yield. 
5. Similar to the tests performed for the Quebec firm portfolios, shown in Table 5, we carried out 
diagnostic tests for the sample of Canadian and American firms. The results, show that our 
estimation models are well specified.    22 
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Table 1 
Panel A :  Size and industry distributions of Quebec Firm Portfolios  
Asset size 
In dollars 
LGO HGO DF  MF 
1000-25000 35%  22%  40%  8% 
25000-50000 29%  25%  44%  0% 
50000-300000 12%  17%  11%  19% 
300000-1500000 3%  17%  4%  19% 
>1500000 
 
21% 19% 0% 54% 
Total number of firms per 
portfolio 
36 35  45  26 
 Panel B :  Industry Distribution of Quebec Firm Portfolios 
Industry LGO  HGO  DF  MF 
Mining 0%  6%  4%  4% 
Products and services  11%  9%  9%  12% 
Furniture 3%  3%  4%  0% 
Engineering 3%  9%  4%  8% 
Mining. and oil exploitation, and 
metallic and chemical industry  
6% 9%  2%  15% 
Forestry and printing  11%  9%  7%  15% 
Technology hardware and software 9%  14%  11%  12% 
Transportation, equipment and 
services 
9% 17%  13%  12% 
Wholesale trading  14%  3%  13%  0% 
Detail trading  14%  9%  18%  0% 
Banking and financial services  20%  14%  13%  23% 
Total number of firms per portfolio  36  35  45  26 
Panel A and B show the size distribution (expressed in 000s of dollars) and the industry distribution of 
Quebec firm portfolios, respectively. LGO is the portfolio of Quebec firms with low growth options, 
HGO is the portfolio of Quebec firms with high growth options, DF is the portfolio of purely domestic 
Quebec firms and MF is the portfolio of multinational Quebec firms.   25 
Table 2 
 Growth Option and International Exposure Distribution of Quebec Firm Portfolios  
 
Portfolio LGO  HGO  Total 
DF 57%  43%  100% 
MF 38%  62%  100% 
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2 are the Ljung-Box (1978) test statistics for the first 12 lags of the autocorrelation 
function for the standardized residuals of the maximum likelihood estimation of the different portfolios 
with constant variance. The p-values, presented in squared parentheses, are for the  ) 12 (
2 χ  distribution. 
M represents returns on the MSCI benchmark portfolio. For portfolio definitions, see notes to Table 1. 
























Table 4   27 
Estimation Results of the Model using Quebec Firm Portfolios 
 
mt it mt m t m m ft mt r R l r R ε γ γ γ + − + + = − − − ) ( 1 1 2 1 0                                                (1) 
() ( ) it ft it i t i ft mt m t m m
mt
imt
i ft it r R l r R l
h
h
r R ε γ γ γ γ γ γ + − + + − + + + = − − − − − 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 ) (   ( 2 )  
A t u t Au B t BH t H ′ − ′ − + ′ − + Γ = 1 1 1 + ' '
1 1 G G t t − − η η + '
1 1 FN D FN t− + '
1 2 UN D UN t−              (3) 
 
 LGO  HGO  DF  MF 








m 2 γ   0.161*  0.026  0.151* 0.026 0.159* 0.025 0.154* 0.026 
i 2 γ   0.099* 0.024 0.158*  0.024  -0.108*  0.026  0.138*  0.023 
m a   -0.092* 0.037 0.162* 0.030  -0.343*  0.009 0.219*  0.018 
m g  0.371*  0.018  0.343* 0.014 0.192* 0.017 0.302* 0.011 
m b   0.897*  0.005  0.884* 0.004 0.886* 0.002 0.890* 0.002 
i a  0.155* 0.010 0.322*  0.019 0.028 0.020  0.297*  0.020 
i g  0.204* 0.015  0.049 0.029  0.271*  0.011  -0.012  0.019 
i b   0.916*  0.003  0.840* 0.007 0.912* 0.002 0.878* 0.008 
i fn   -0.023 0.053 -0.014  0.032  -0.066*  0.022  -0.009  0.035 
i un   0.126* 0.064  0.114 0.066  0.109*  0.055 0.090 0.054 
* represents significant coefficients under robust standard errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992)) at 
the 5% level of significance. M represents returns on the MSCI benchmark portfolio. For portfolio 
definitions see notes to Table 1. The sample period goes from January 1990 to December 1996. 
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Table 5 
Diagnostic Checks of the Model using Quebec Firm Portfolios 
     LGO  HGO  DF  MF 
































Conditional moment tests (Newey, 1985) for the presence of favorable and unfavorable news in the mean 
and covariance of each portfolio. P-values in squared parentheses are for the  ) 1 (
2 χ  distribution. For 
portfolio definitions see notes to Table 1. The sample period goes from January 1990 to December 1996.    29 
Table 6 
Estimation Results of the Model using Matching Canadian Firm Portfolios 
mt it mt m t m m ft mt r R l r R ε γ γ γ + − + + = − − − ) ( 1 1 2 1 0        ( 1 )  
() ( ) it ft it i t i ft mt m t m m
mt
imt
i ft it r R l r R l
h
h
r R ε γ γ γ γ γ γ + − + + − + + + = − − − − − 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 ) (   ( 2 )  
A u Au BH H t t B t ′ ′ + + Γ = − − − ′ 1 1 1 t + ' '
1 1 G G t t − − η η + '
1 1 FN D FN t− + '
1 2 UN D UN t−               (3) 
 
 
 OPF  OPE  ED  EMN 








m 2 γ   0,155* 0,025 0,153* 0,025 0,156* 0,026 0,152* 0,025 
i 2 γ   0,148* 0,025 0,094* 0,025 0,046* 0,024 0,123* 0,023 
m a   0,375* 0,013 0,186* 0,032 0,381* 0,066 0,348* 0,012 
m g   0,103* 0,029  0,301*  0,018 0,012 0,113  0,122*  0,021 
m b  0,873* 0,003 0,904* 0,005 0,879* 0,038 0,893* 0,002 
i a  0,092* 0,020  0,268*  0,011 0,094 0,058  0,222*  0,010 
i g   -0,381* 0,021 0,052* 0,020 -0,239* 0,045 -0,217* 0,018 
i b  0,808* 0,006 0,938* 0,002 0,856* 0,033 0,927* 0,002 
i fn   -0,088* 0,022  -0,024  0,032 -0,061* 0,030  -0,006 0,028 
i un   0,159* 0,077 -0,013 0,035 0,110* 0,053 -0,004 0,037 
* represents significant coefficients under robust standard errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992)) at 
the 5% level of significance. M represents returns on the MSCI benchmark portfolio. For portfolio 



















LIST OF POLITICAL NEWS 
 
 






Speculation about Quebec seeking independence has many investors worried; concern 





Newfoundland introduced a legislative resolution to rescind the province’s ratification of 





Mulroney accepted a New Brunswick government initiative intended to overcome 
Canada’s constitutional impasse that has revived independence talk in Quebec. 
Favorable 
June 1
st , 1990  Mulroney called the country’s 10 provincial premiers to an emergency meeting in a effort 
to end a constitutional deadlock over granting Quebec special status. 
Favorable 
June 4
th, 1990  Mulroney held emergency talks in Ottawa with the 10 provincial premiers in a effort to 
break a constitutional impasse over granting Quebec special status. 
Favorable 
June 6
th, 1990  Mulroney held closed-door negotiations in a bid to win over 2 holdout provinces and 
prevent the collapse of talks aimed at resolving the constitutional impasse. 
Favorable 
June 8
th, 1990  Talks in Canada over the recognition of Quebec as a distinct society stalled as the 10 
provincial leaders sought to resolve constitutional differences. 
Unfavorable 
June 11
th, 1990  Canada’s leaders have patched together an agreement that would give Quebec special 




nd, 1990  Mulroney asked Newfoundlanders to help rescue a constitutional amendment that is 
aimed at keeping French-speaking Quebec in Canada’s federation. 
Favorable 
June 25
th, 1990  Quebec’s leaders said that the province will draw up its own terms and conditions for 
staying in Canada after the collapse of the Meech Lake accord. 
Unfavorable 
August 17
th, 1990  Robert Bourassa, in response to questions from editors of the Wall Street Journal, 





Quebec’s Liberal Party said the rest of Canada must agree to a radical constitutional 











Bourassa said staying in Canada is still Quebec’s first choice after his Liberal Party 





Canadian Bond Rating Service Inc. put Quebec government securities and Hydro-




A bipartisan commission studying Quebec’s political future will recommend that the 
provincial government hold a referendum on sovereignty in October 1992. 
Unfavorable 
April 22
nd, 1991  Mulroney restructured his cabinet to try to deal more effectively with Canada’s more 
serious problems, principally the renewed threat of secession of Quebec. 
Favorable 
July 19





The Canadian government intends to announce proposals to rewrite the country’s 
constitution, an initiative expected to provoke fights among parties. 
Unfavorable 
March 2
nd, 1992  Canada’s major political parties plan to rewrite the constitution to address the issues; 





The Canadian government introduced legislation in Parliament to hold a national vote on 
the constitutional changes needed to keep Quebec in Canada. 
Favorable 
June 12
th, 1992  Negotiations among Canada’s provinces over efforts to accommodate French-speaking 





Negotiators trying to rewrite Canada’s constitution and keep Quebec in Canada appear 





A plan to alter Canada’s constitution was agreed upon by the federal government, 9 






Robert Bourassa said the Quebec government will study a constitutional plan agreed to 
in July by the federal government and 9 other provinces; Bourassa wouldn’t say if the 
plan is acceptable, though. 
Favorable 
August 5
th, 1992  A two-year boycott of Canadian political talks by Bourassa ended with his meeting with 
Mulroney and provincial leaders who are trying to resolve a dispute that could keep 
Quebec from separation. 
Favorable 
August 20
th, 1992  Canadian political leaders approved a plan to restructure the federal Parliament, clearing 




th, 1992  Mulroney is expected to propose on August 27
th that Canada hold a national vote on a 




st , 1992 
 
At a convention on August 29
th, the Quebec government approved the package of 






Mulroney called for an October 26
th vote on a Canadian constitutional agreement that 






Canada’s French speakers are dwindling, as birth rates drop and immigration brings in 
other tongues. French speakers fell to 24,9% of the population but still remain a majority 






Canadian financial markets were upset on September 29
th after Mulroney warned that 
Canada’s future was at risk in the next referendum. The harsh words triggered sales of 
Canadian dollars and securities. 
Unfavorable 
  2October 23
rd, 1992  With Canadians confused and angry, the outcome of the October 26
th referendum on an 
agreement to amend the Canadian constitution is in doubt. 
Unfavorable 
October 27
th, 1992  A package of changes to Canada’s constitution was rejected by Canadian voters; the 




th, 1992  A day after Canadian voters rejected a constitutional plan intended to persuade Quebec 
to stay in Canada, separatists in Quebec renewed their campaign for greater autonomy. 
Unfavorable 
October 28
th, 1992  Following the rejection of a constitutional plan intended to persuade Quebec to stay in 
Canada, exhilarated separatists in Quebec renewed their campaign for independence. 
Unfavorable 
March 4
th, 1993  Few Canadians were more gratified to see the resignation of Brian Mulroney than 
Quebec’s separatists, especially Lucien Bouchard, who quit his cabinet post in 1990 to 





Robert Bourassa said he won’t seek another term. The announcement came after 






The Bloc Québécois appears to have eliminated any chance for the ruling Conservative 





st , 1994  Bouchard will visit Washington DC on  Mar.2 to tell Americans not to worry about his 
campaign to break up Canada. 
Unfavorable 
June 7
th, 1994  The Parti Québécois, favoured to win in the 1994 Quebec elections, is warning financial 




th, 1994  Opinion polls show that the Parti Québécois is carrying a solid lead in the general 
election campaign. Parizeau vows to stage a referendum on Quebec’s independence 8 
to 10 months after winning power. 
Unfavorable 
September 9
th, 1994  Although it seems that the Parti Québécois will win Quebec’s general election on 
September 12
th, it will not be a mandate for independence. Fewer than 40% of 





The unexpectedly slim margin of victory for the Parti Québécois in Sept.12 provincial 




th, 1994  Jean Chrétien said that Quebec will vote to stay in Canada when the province holds a 
referendum in 1995.  
Favorable 
December 5
th, 1994  Lucien Bouchard developed a flesh-eating infection during the week of Nov.28 that 




th, 1994  Parizeau unveiled his separatist government’s proposals for turning the primarily 




nd, 1995  Following a poll showing public support for independence stuck at 40%, some advocates 
for Quebec’s independence are urging changes in the ruling Parti Québécois strategy. 
Favorable 
September 8
th, 1995  The Quebec government announced the wording of the long-awaited referendum for 
independence. The date, while as yet not set, is expected to be Oct.30, 1995. 
Unfavorable 
  3September 27
th, 
1995 
The Canadian finance minister ruled out any economic union between Canada and a 
separate Quebec, saying Canadians would have too much to lose. 
Unfavorable 
October 23
rd, 1995  With Quebec’s referendum on independence due on October 30
th, there are growing 
indications that separatists could pull off a narrow upset victory. 
Unfavorable 
October 25
th, 1995  A few days away from the October 30
th referendum, opinion polls say that half the 
citizens of Quebec are prepared to cast a vote that could tear the country apart. 
Unfavorable 
October 26
th, 1995  The Cree Indians of northern Quebec, in a separate vote ahead of the provincial 
referendum, voted 96% in favor of remaining a part of Canada if a majority of Quebec 
residents vote to secede. 
Ambiguous 
October 27
th, 1995  New opinion polls in Quebec indicated that the vote in the referendum on independence 
will be close. Ten thousand Canadians were converging on Montreal for a rally in 
support of a united Canada. 
Unfavorable 
October 27
th, 1995  A polling firm found 44,5% of Quebeckers support the independence proposition, with 
42,2% opposed and 13,2% undecided or declining to state a preference. 
Unfavorable 
October 31
st , 1995  With 99% of the ballots counted, Quebec voted narrowly against independence, averting 
a potential breakup of Canada. The tight vote means the federal government  will be 
under pressure to pursue major changes. 
Ambiguous 
November 1
st, 1995  In the long run, the vote in the referendum could not have been worse for Canada 




nd, 1995  After the referendum, Moody’s said the strong separatist showing has negative 









Jean Chrétien said he hopes a ministerial committee will report to him in Dec. on 
suggestions for changing Quebec’s status; critics say Chrétien isn’t acting quickly 





The Canadian government proposed that the federal Parliament approve legislation 
recognizing the province of Quebec as a distinct society in Canada. 
Favorable 
January 26
th, 1996  Chrétien overhauled his cabinet to help combat the Quebec separatist threat and 
prepare for elections. Chrétien appointed two Quebec commentators to strengthen his 
hand in the session battle. 
Unfavorable 
February 1
st, 1996  While Bouchard, Quebec’s new premier, prepares to lead the province out of Canada, a 
growing number of Montreal activists are drawing up plan to secede from Quebec and 
become a city-state. 
Favorable 
May 13
th, 1996  On May 10, 1996, Canada’s federal government and Quebec clashed over a court case 
challenging the province’s right to secede unilaterally. The developments, concerning the federal 
government’s decision to intervene in the case, raised the possibility of snap elections in Quebec, 
rattling Canadian bond and currency markets. 
Unfavorable 
May 13
th, 1996  Quebec’s separatist leaders backed away from a threat to call an early election, but took 




  4August 22
nd, 1996  Quebec Canada’s French vs English language feud, relatively quiet in recent years, is 
flaring up again in the summer of 1996, and government officials fear the ruckus may 






The Canadian government has decided to challenge the Canadian supreme court. The 
Quebec government claims that Quebec can automatically separate from Canada if 
Quebec residents vote in favor of independence. 
 
Unfavorable 
*  The Wall Street Journal report date. 
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